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Cosmopolitan Plurality in Arendt's Political Philosophy
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:07:05 GMTThe essay interrogates the cosmopolitan level of Arendts political philosophy from the viewpoint of her reflections on plurality, the norm of limitless communication and her diagnosis of political institutions. Arendts conception of the political and plurality is inherently non-national in character, but she nevertheless rejects the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship. In place of this she introduces the notion of limitless communication. This ideal can be understood either as a straightforward development of the normative ideal of plurality on a cosmopolitan level or as replacing plurality with a slightly different but possible ideal. The essay brings together Arendts conception of plurality with her reflections on the value of political institutions. Plurality comprises five aspects: equality, diversity, active participation, the shared world as a central mediating factor and the interactive or communicative dimension. According to Arendt institutional frameworks should ideally be designed both to make such participatory plurality and politics possible and as safeguards against rule. These tasks should also be preserved on a cosmopolitan level. This implies the importance of cosmopolitan institutions that are not intended as designed towards any ideal to establish a supreme global political authority, an idea that Arendt finds highly dangerous.poj@peeters-leuven.beTowards an Arendtian Politics of In/visibility
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:09:02 GMTThis article first aims to reconstruct an Arendtian politics of in/visibility. Section one interprets Arendts reflections on stateless aliens in inter-war Europe, and the next section provides a conceptual background by situating the politics of visibility within Arendts more theoretical-philosophical writings on politics. By juxtaposing her account with current Dutch policies and practices concerning aliens in the last section, this article next aims to investigate the relevance and currency of the Arendtian politics of in/visibility. Arguing for the continuing relevance of Arendts account, the article nevertheless shows that technologically advanced regimes of exposing have emerged which Arendt neither has nor could take account of. Moreover, this article argues that these regimes, which reinforce the naturalism of the nation-state system even further, have invited particular groups of aliens i.e., illegal migrants to adopt counterstrategies of individual self-obscuration that would have been incomprehensible to Arendt.poj@peeters-leuven.beThe Sovereign and the Social
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:11:12 GMTIn this article, I claim that Arendt understands Hobbes not only as the theoretical father of totalitarianism, but also of what Arendt calls the social. I do so by first presenting her view on imperialism and the rise of the bourgeoisie as a general framework. Then, I focus on her reading of Hobbess Leviathan. Hobbes gives birth to a state that asks for absolute obedience, depriving all his subjects of political, or (for Arendt) participation rights. This leads to Arendts understanding of sovereignty as domination. According to Arendt, Hobbess Leviathan not only gives rise to power politics, but also to totalitarianism. Hobbess new model of politics is reduced to a function of society and has socialized men. Politics is reduced to government, while human beings are reduced to bourgeoisie. As I show, these changes give rise to another monster, the social, or what Pitkin calls the Blob. Thus, Hobbes is not only the theoretical father of totalitarianism, but also of the Blob. This leads me to sketch Arendts metaphysics of presence, that is, how only actual acting brings about the political. To do so, I contrast Arendt with Claude Leforts theory of democracy.poj@peeters-leuven.beCreating Citizens in the Classroom
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:14:33 GMTIn The Crisis in Education, her only essay dedicated to the topic of education, Hannah Arendt presents a position that in many ways runs counter to her conception of the political based on participation, actions and the potential for radical change. In so doing, she provides her readers, both political and pedagogical, with a perspective on education that challenges its instrumentalization for the sake of the political. To appreciate the counter-cultural yet commonsense claim Arendt makes, I will first consider the meaning of the term citizenship and its Arendtian interpretation in a political context. Second, focusing on Arendts 1958 essay, I will explain why education is not first and foremost a public issue and therefore should not be interpreted as belonging to a political context. Connected to this, I bring to light Arendts well known discourse of the ensuing dangers of a confusion of the private and public realms. Her somewhat unwelcomed pedagogical-political contribution confronts us with our assumption that the solution to the crisis in citizenship lies within schools, showing it as yet another symptom of the political crisis of modernity. Having shown how and why schools cannot be asked to create citizens, I will immersed in a paradox that Arendt recognizes consider several means by which education can, in a secondary role, help us to understand and reflect upon the contemporary crisis in citizenship.poj@peeters-leuven.beBook Reviews
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:14:45 GMTBook reviewspoj@peeters-leuven.beContributors
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:14:59 GMTContributorspoj@peeters-leuven.beAgainst Violence, but not at Any Price
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:04:55 GMTHannah Arendt reproaches our tradition of political philosophy for reducing politics to domination, and for so concealing the central political phenomenon, i.e., power (section one). Since Arendts own concept of power is an extension of her concept of action, she understands power in a both non-hierarchical and non-instrumental way, as much distinct from domination as from violence. Furthermore, by stressing the essential relational and potential character of power, she shows the impossibility of human omnipotence (section two). Section three sketches Arendts analysis of violent action as an instrumental, mute and solitary activity, which can destroy, but never generate power, and which, therefore, can never be more than a poor substitute for acting together. However, the priority of power over violence is not absolute: sometimes power needs violence to maintain itself. Arendt seems to recognize this, but nowhere elaborates it (see the concluding remarks).poj@peeters-leuven.beIntroduction
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:01:04 GMTIntroductionpoj@peeters-leuven.beReluctant Democratic Egalitarianism
Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:02:17 GMTThis article claims that Arendts political theory is about power. By combining several different dimensions of power, I develop a simple cross-table by which I compare Arendt with the notions of power of other philosophers, such Weber, Marx, Habermas, and Foucault. In contrast to these thinkers, Arendt presents us with different notions of power. After briefly discussing each of her notions, I focus on her understanding of constitutionalism. Arendt is embedded in the Hegelian and German Staatsrecht-tradition of constitutionalism. However, her thought also entails the idea of a revolutionary constitution. And although she shrank back from the radical democratic consequences of this idea, she did develop the categories of power that we need to draw the critical distinction between the branches of power constituting the communicative power of the people and the branches of repressive power.poj@peeters-leuven.be
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